Outlawry had been a daily occurrence in the life of Heian-kyo since the ninth century, requiring an extensive system of military guards and attendants to provide security for the court and its officers.36The statutory code provided for several bodies of guards to man the many gates of the imperial palace and to serve as ceremonial escorts for the emperor. Their effectiveness, however, largely evaporated in the Heian period as their manpower dwindled, leaving even the palace itself vulnerable to arson, robbery, and murder. The government hadsought since the Nara period to assure the personal safety and dig nity of higher officials by assigning attendants (toneri) to them for guard and escort duty in numbers varying according to their ranks, ranging from twenty at the lower end of the scale up to four hundred at the highest.
Although the toneri attendants were merely provin cial conscripts and had minimal military skills, their use by nobles for private purposes came to be disruptive of public order, and they
were replaced in the case of the highest officials with somewhat better-born guard-officials called zuijin («escorts»), who were organiza tionally attached to the Imperial Bodyguards. Fewer in number than the toneri, the handsomely uniformed zuijin escorts were prized more for their appearance than for their military accomplishments, andgreat nobles were typically forced to augment their security with pri vately recruited forces of tsuwamono warriors.
Police officers known as kebiishi (Offenses Investigation Agents) are first mentioned in 816. Their mission was the maintenance of public order in the capital and its environs and the investigation of crimes. By 834 a kebiishi office was established within the palace grounds as Imperial Police. The remarkable expansion of the office’sfunctions and its involvement in activities in other provinces is discussed in Chapter 1. And yet it seems to have fallen short of meeting all of the needs for security in Kyoto. Various guard units con tinued to proliferate within the Great Imperial Palace and elsewhere in the capital. Not even the emperor felt safe.
In 890, to protect himself from the deposed and dangerously hostile emperor Yozei, Em peror Uda found it expedient to establish a special unit of Imperial Bodyguards called the takiguchi («water spout»), supposedly namedafter the location of the headquarters for the group near the entrance of a stream or irrigation canal into the grounds of the Sei ryoden, the chief ceremonial palace of the Emperor’s Residential Compound. Numbering only ten men at its founding, the takiguchi group expanded to thirty in the reign of Go-Shirakawa. Its memberswere non-nobles of the Sixth Rank attached to the Chamberlain’s Office (kurddodokoro), in the late Heian period the appointments be coming hereditary in warrior lines of theTaira and Minamoto clans.
Two similar guard groups were instituted for the palaces of the re tired emperors, the first either in the time of Uda (ex. emp. 897-931) or later by En’yu (ex. emp. 984-91), and the second under Shirakawa (ex. emp. 1087-1129). The earlier group, called the mushadokoro(«Martialists’ Office») was initially composed of ten warriors recruited mainly from the ranks of the takiguchi, its complement gradually increasing until by the time of ex-emperor Shirakawa it num bered thirty. The second, later, group was called the in-no-hokumen,or simply hokumen («north face»)- Organized from low-ranking offi cers without imperial audience privileges, the hokumen became the core of the military strength of the ex-emperors, including in its ranks most notably Taira no Masamori, the grandfather of the first military dictator, Kiyomori.
As the Taira moved into high offices at court in the twelfth century, acquiring audience privileges and establishing themselves as the paramount warriors of the capital, the importance of the guards declined, and hokumen appointments instead came to be used as a means of bringing otherwise socially debarred favorites and useful supporters into the court of the ex-emperor: artists andperformers, kebiishi, and provincial officials. The poet Saigyo (1118 90), for instance, was a hokumen. After theTaira seized control of the government, the hokumen under ex-emperor Go-Shirakawa served as personal attendants of the ex-emperor, becoming an important focus of anti-Taira sentiment; they were involved, for example, in the Shishigatani plot of 1177.
The official kebiishi and guard groups were not always able to en sure the safety of even the most exalted court figures, as ex-emperor Kazan discovered in 996 when he is reported to have come under arrow attack at the direction of a disgruntled Fujiwara lover. Lesser leaders of the society were even more vulnerable to the outlawry ofthe times. Princes, regents, chief ministers, and other prominent no bles often found it necessary to establish private guard units within their own palaces and mansions in quarters called the saburaidokoro («Attendants’ Office»).
They recruited tsuwamono who had proved their prowess in fighting. Tsuwamono who attended (saburau) court nobles at their beck and call came to be called saburai, which later became samurai. This name for the hired guards at first lacked thehonor associated with the word tsuwamono. But warriors who previ ously may have used and sharpened their military skills in banditryor revolt could thus sometimes find themselves transformed into defenders of their former enemies and victims. Enrollment in the ser vice of a great noble at the capital brought high political connectionsand prestige that could be used in attracting retainers into a war rior’s own service, and the chieftains (toryo) of the warrior clans were thus willing to accept service with regents and ministers.
But asthe might of the warriors came to be increasingly decisive in the affairs of the capital, and as the warriors themselves rose in government rank and office, they posed an ever growing threat to the po litical authority of their noble lords.
The court was frequently under threat from the armed monks (sdhei) of the great temples near the capital. Although Buddhist teachings forbade monks to carry arms, that proscription had early been ignored in China, and clerical warriors were known also in Japan by the eighth century. But it was not until the tenth century,following a rapid growth in temple populations, that larger, wealthier temples organized armies to protect and assert their own inter ests and to control and manage a not always peaceable brotherhood.
The armies were recruited from the more unruly elements within the temples themselves and also from the temples’ shoen. In 1006, Kofukuji in Nara fielded a fighting force of three thousand men. By 1113, Kofukuji and Enryakuji were said to have mobilized»tens of thousands» of armed monks in a dispute over the appoint ment of a priest trained at Enryakuji as chief administrator (betto) of Kiyomizudera, a branch temple of Kofukuji.
Armed monks of the Enryakuji (overlooking the capital on the northeast) and Onjoji (in present Otsu), being close to Kyoto, were especially prominent in the history of the eleventh century, when their large bands marched into the capital in order to press petitions and demands (goso), backed by the threat of imminent violence, on the court or on individual courtiers.
The belligerent intrusions of the monks were usually sup ported and protected by displaying symbols of the temples’ guardian shrines, the Kofukuji monks carrying at the head of their procession the «divine tree» (shimboku) of the Kasuga Shrine, and the Enryakuji monks descending from Mount Hiei bearing the sacred palanquin (mikoshi) of Hie Shrine.
Armed monks descended on the capital sixty times during the years of the retired emperors Shirakawa, Toba, and Go-Shirakawa. To counter the threat of these religious institutions,the court relied on the Imperial Police, the hokumen warriors, and, increasingly, on the toryo of the Minamoto andTaira clans. Heike mono gatari quotes Shirakawa as lamenting: «Three things refuse to obey my will: the waters of the Kamo River, the fall of backgammon dice, and the monks of Enryakuji Temple.»
(For more on the actions of the armed monks, see Chapter 7.) The heads of the military branches of the Minamoto and Tairawere regarded as proper chieftains (toryo) only if they had demonstrated superior martial prowess. Of equal importance were connec tions with the highest levels at court. Hence they maintained a basein the capital, where they and their kin were appointed to a succes sion of court titles related to guard offices and they served as private protection for members of the imperial and noble families. The most successful served a succession of province governorships. They built their family’s economic strength by acquiring shoen in the provinces, some of which they commended to their highest patrons at court.
These acts of commendation and gifts of land and horses to their pa trons were essential for advancement in court position. The toryo welcomed imperial appointments to lead punitive expeditions to punish enemies of the court, even though they had to recruit mostof the military force, because a successful campaign could bring pro motion in court rank and position as well as high esteem in the eyes of other tsuwamono. Generation after generation, the toryo of the Seiwa Genji were highly successful in this process: Yorinobu settling the Tadatsune uprising, his son Yoriyoshi victorious in the Earlier Nine Years’War, and the latter’s son Yoshiie in the Later Three Years’ War. Yoshiie was acknowledged as the peerless warrior (musha) of the realm. In the words of a popular song, «Of all the Minamoto, Hachiman Taro [Yoshiie] is the most feared.» Yet he remained a samurai of the retired emperor.
Shirakawa, who became the first cloistered emperor (in) in 1087(see Chapter 9), was extremely effective both in employing the war rior leaders to his advantage and in balancing rivals against each other to deflect the danger inherent in their increasing strength.
Yoshiie, after gaining a reputation as a courageous fighter as a youngman in the Earlier Nine Years’ War, spent many years doing Shi rakawa’s bidding. However, he was not reappointed to a lucrative position after the Later Three Years’War, from which he emerged as the preeminent warrior. The compensation he gave to his men out of his own resources won the admiration of the warrior class.
The court was much concerned to check his power and influence, and the opportunity came when there was the confrontation in 1091 between his powerful bushidan and the strong force of his brother Yoshitsuna. The prospect of their forces clashing near the capital alarmed thegovernment, but the regent, Morozane, was able to mediate the dis pute. To control Yoshiie he obtained an imperial order forbidding provincial troops from coming up to the capital and also prohibiting landowners from commending additional land to Yoshiie.
The pres tige of this powerful toryo among provincial landholders posed a threat to the balance of power at court, for the elite had long derived most of its revenue from the possession and commendation of shoen. As commander of the next punitive expedition two years later, Shirakawa turned to Yoshiie’s brother and rival and rewarded him with elevation to the Fourth Rank.
Five years later Shirakawa mol lified Yoshiie by granting him the privilege of entrance to his private quarters. The aristocrats were appalled that a tsuwamono was allowed to enter their world on an equal footing.
In 1106, Yoshiie died at the age of sixty-seven, occasioning a strug gle to succeed to the position of the Minamoto toryo. By this time thebushidan no longer dissolved on the death of the leader, and it be came customary for the eldest son to succeed his father. However, Yoshiie’s eldest son died young, his second son, the powerful warrior Yoshichika, was exiled for murder while governor of Tsushima, and when another son was killed, Yoshitsuna and his son were rumored tobe implicated. Yoshichika’s thirteen-year-old son, Tameyoshi (1096 1156), was commissioned to arrest Yoshitsuna, and he was credited with this feat.
He succeeded his grandfather as the Minamoto toryo. However, there was little aristocratic support for a young toryo, and the Minamoto bushidan weakened significantly. Many of the leaders left the capital for their bases in the provinces. The Minamoto of thegeneration of Yoshiie and his sons and nephews left a record of vio lence, lawlessness, and mutually destructive behavior that cost the family its reputation as the leading samurai. Shirakawa, who had fomented Minamoto factionalism as a means of checking theirstrength, had already chosen the Ise Heishi (Heishi is the Sino-Japanese reading of «Taira clan») as their replacement. Despite a less de veloped bushidan, with Shirakawa’s backing the Taira would rise higher and more quickly than the Minamoto.
Although the Taira had originally considered the vast easternplains their own, they had gradually been absorbed into the Mina moto network after the Tadatsune rebellion. Taira no Korehira was an exception. The ancestor of the Ise Heishi (a branch of the Kammu Heishi) and probably a son or grandson adopted by Sadamori (seeFigure 9.7, Genealogy of the Taira), Korehira is believed to have es tablished an estate in Ise when he was appointed governor in 1006.
However, his connection with Ise predated this appointment. In 998, Fujiwara noYukinari’s diary Gonki records a large-scale dispute over land in Ise between the two renowned warriors, Korehira and Tairano Muneyori (d. 1011), and their many roto.45 Both men were summoned to the capital for interrogation by the Imperial Police and de tained there. Korehira apologized and, on the recommendation of the Minister of the Right, was appointed governor of Ise. Michinaga,who was allied with the Minamoto, unsuccessfully opposed the ap pointment.
However, he ensured that Korehira’s descendantswould not be appointed to higher office in the capital than the Im perial Police.
Three generations later, Taira no Masamori was appointed gover nor of Oki. Unable to derive much revenue from the small island, he developed the family land bequeathed to him by his ancestors in Iseand Iga. In 1098 he commended twenty cho (66 acres) of his holdings in Iga to the Rokujo-in, formerly the residence in Kyoto of Shi rakawa’s favorite daughter, Teishi (Ikuhomon-in). When she died at the age of twenty, the grieving Shirakawa became a priest and turned the residence into a temple dedicated to her salvation.
The act ofcommendation was probably suggested by Shirakawa’s female at tendant, the Gion Consort, who was a neighbor of Masamori. This provided Masamori with political backing in his disputes over land with the powerful Todaiji and Ise Shrine. It was also the first step by the Ise Heishi toward employment in the capital and political power.
After further gifts to Shirakawa, Masamori was employed as a guardin the hokumen. This was the first time that a Taira had been em ployed by a retired emperor.
The fact that the Taira had not been favored by the Fujiwara madethem attractive to Shirakawa. Masamori was appointed to lead an at tack onYoshiie’s son, the powerful warrior Minamoto noYoshichika.
Yoshichika, who had been accused of murder and plunder while serving as governor of Tsushima and had been exiled to Oki, left hisisland exile and in 1107 crossed over to Izumo, where he killed a pro vincial deputy and looted government stores. Masamori, then in thevicinity as governor of Inaba, was commissioned to attack Yoshi chika. He distinguished himself by killing Yoshichika and four of his chief retainers, and Shirakawa rewarded him and his sons lavishly.
Shirakawa’s trusted aide, the Consultant (sangi) and literatus Fujiwara no Munetada, complained of the favoritism shown by the retired emperor to such a low-ranking warrior, granting him the gov ernorship of the prized province of Tamba.
With Masamori’s triumphal return to the capital, the martial reputation of the Tairabegan to rival the Minamotos’. However, some doubted that a relative unknown could have succeeded so easily against a seasoned war rior. It was suggested that the severed head so prominently displayed had not belonged to Yoshichika.
Masamori received other important commissions. In 1113, he and Minamoto no Tameyoshi fought to defend the capital against armed monks, and Masamori allowed his young sonTadamori (1096—1153)much of the credit. In 1119, while governor of Bizen, Masamori defeated brigands who had threatened the capital, and he also sup pressed rebels in Kyushu, for which he was awarded the Fourth Rank.
Tadamori was granted many opportunities to demonstrate his prowess and speed his rise through the ranks. According to Ima kagami (1170), Tadamori’s wife, the sister of the Gion Consort, spoke to Shirakawa often on his behalf.
In 1129, he moved against the pirates of the Inland Sea.
These pirates were coordinating raids involving dozens of ships to prey on the shipments by shoen of theannual dues to their guarantors and central proprietors in the capi tal.
To judge from tales in Konjaku monogatari-shu, however, there does not seem to have been sufficient pirate activity to warrant a court-ordered military campaign against them. It was more likely that Tadamori, as governor of Bizen, had requested permission to confront the pirates.
In 1135, Tadamori led a procession of prisoners through the streets of the capital. According to Choshuki, «Tadamori had taken seventy pirates prisoner. . . . Everyone came to see them. He displayed the head of the pirate Hidaka Zenshi, but most of the captives were not pirates. It is said that Tadamori had taken men and presented them as ‘pirate captives’.»
The forty «pirates» who were not immediately turned over to the Imperial Police were presumably released after the victory procession had served its propagandistic function. As related in Heike monogatari, Tadamori was ridiculed at court for his provincial origins. He realized that military successes were not enough to gain acceptance in elite society, and that he neededalso to develop the skills of a courtier. His dancing at the Kamo Fes tival in 1119 was admired. But in 1130 he was invited to a poetrycomposition party in the retired emperor’s residence, where his po etry was judged «not good.»
In 1132, when he built the Sanjiisan gendo for Retired Emperor Toba, he was granted the extraordinary privilege of entry into the ex-emperor’s private quarters. Tadamori managed to narrow the distance between the worlds of the warriorand the aristocrat. His courtly skills and financial resources com pensated in part for the lesser degree of development of the Taira bushidan.
In their encounters with the pirates, Masamori and Tadamori had become aware of the profits to be made in foreign trade. Sung and Koryo traders negotiated under the jurisdiction of the Dazaifu. By the eleventh century, many of the Dazaifu officials had begun to expand private trade at the expense of official trade. There was agreat market for foreign goods. Appointed as an official on Shi rakawa’s Kanazaki shden in Hizen, Tadamori drew up documents to try to convince the Dazaifu officials that the retired emperor had granted him permission to trade directly with Chinese ships that arrived in 1133.
By the time of his death in 1153, Tadamori had secured a strong economic base for the Ise Heishi in landholding and trade, as well as a leading role among the warrior nobles at court. It was from thisprivileged position that his son Kiyomori (1118-81) began his spectacular career as warrior and politician, exploiting the factional ri valries among emperors, retired emperors, and Fujiwara families to rise to the highest offices at court.